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Rules and Reality: Quantifying the Practice of Apprenticeship in 
Early Modern Europe1
Chris Minns and Patrick Wallis* 
 
 
Abstract:   
This paper uses recently digitised samples of apprentices and 
masters in London and Bristol to quantify the practice of 
apprenticeship in the late 17th century.  Apprenticeship appears 
much more fluid than is traditionally understood.  Many apprentices 
did not complete their terms of indenture; late arrival and early 
departure from the master’s household was widespread.   Other 
apprentices appear to have been absent temporarily, returning to 
the master shortly before the end of their indenture.  Regression 
analysis indicates that the patterns of presence and absence are 
broadly reflective of the resources and outside opportunities 
available to apprentices.   
 
 
Early modern apprenticeship has been characterized as rigid, 
inflexible and inefficiently regulated. In many ways, the terms of debate 
remain those set by Adam Smith when he attacked the ‘corporation spirit’ 
of towns and cities for hindering competition and raising prices. Smith 
focused his ire on apprenticeship, which formed the cornerstone of the 
exclusive privileges of urban masters. At its simplest, apprenticeship 
involves the exchange of labour and sometimes money for training given 
on the job. In early modern Europe, apprenticeship was often highly 
regulated, with rules on who could enter service, how long they must 
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serve, what they could do during their terms, and how many apprentices 
a master might take. According to Smith, English apprenticeships in 
particular were too long, they tended to make the young lazy, they 
hindered outsiders from using their own abilities, and above all they were 
a conspiracy to raise wages and prices to the benefit of masters.2 Smith’s 
views on the rent-seeking and self-interested orientation of corporate 
apprenticeship have many adherents.3  
Apprenticeship does have its defenders, who emphasize that it was 
a critical avenue for skill formation in early modern Europe: it is the 
historical antecedent of industrial apprenticeship and present day firm-
based training schemes, it socialised youths into the urban world, and it 
provided a means to facilitate and manage migration, facilitating the flow 
of labour from agriculture into manufacturing and services.  The craft 
training supplied through apprenticeship has been identified as a conduit 
for technological change in pre-modern Europe.4 The most optimistic view 
of apprenticeship is probably best expressed in the idea that, for most, 
service ‘provided stability for a child, a secure future, with guaranteed 
employment and limited competition’.5 However, even among those who 
have sought to rehabilitate corporate apprenticeship, Smith’s view that 
this pre-modern institution worked in the manner envisaged in law and 
custom often survives.6 Whether the outcome was socially beneficial or 
not, the working assumption in most of the literature has been that 
apprenticeship contracts were stable and largely effective: the most 
 
2 Smith, Wealth of Nations, Book 1, Chapter X, part II.  
3 George, London Life, pp. 225-86; Hay, Masters, pp. 1-8, 62-99; Ogilvie, ‘Guilds’, pp. 
302-14; Ogilvie, ‘Social Capital’, pars. 16-19; Hickson & Thompson, ‘New theory’, pp. 
140-1. For later developments: Hay, Masters; Steinberg, ‘Unfree labor’.  
4 Epstein, ‘Craft Guilds, Apprenticeship’, pp. 688-93; Humphries, ‘English 
Apprenticeship’; Gustaffson, ‘Rise’, p. 21; De Munck & Soly, ‘Learning’; Rule, 
Experience, pp. 95-123. 
5 Lane, Apprenticeship, p. 2.  
6 For a more cautious view, see: Davids, ‘Apprenticeship’. 
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recent debate has been about the effects of these long terms of service, 
not whether they were enforced in the first place.7  
In this paper, we seek to assess the extent to which the reality of 
pre-modern apprenticeship mirrored the ideal set out in law and corporate 
regulation. Apprenticeship presents many of the standard analytical 
problems familiar to students of pre-modern institutions. We have more 
evidence about the laws, ordinances and customs that notionally set the 
rules of the game than we do about the practice of apprenticeship itself. 
We lack almost any evidence of the direct costs and benefits of the 
training and labour exchanges involved in service, let alone any 
indications of the longer-term benefits that apprentices may have gained 
from their experience and qualifications. We even know very little about 
apprentices’ and masters’ behaviour between the two relatively easily 
observed moments of indenturing and freedom: to what extent were the 
expectations of a full term of service met? Or, as Steven Kaplan put it: ‘at 
what point and why does an aspiring apprentice abandon the trajectory?’8 
It is this last issue that we concern ourselves with here. A small but 
fascinating literature on apprentices’ who failed to complete their terms 
exists, but beyond scattered texts and legal records, evidence has largely 
been unavailable about what happened to apprentices during their 
terms.9 To address this, we have created two samples of apprentices and 
masters in London and Bristol in the 1690s for which we can observe the 
persistence of apprenticeship – essentially, the proportion of apprentices 
who were living with their masters at different stages in their terms of 
service. 
 
7 See: Ogilvie, ‘Guilds’; Epstein, ‘Craft guilds: a discussion’, pp. 160-2, 165-7; Ogilvie, 
‘Rehabilitating’. Non-completion is central to recent work on North America: Hamilton, 
‘Enforcement’; idem, ‘Decline’; Elbaum, ‘Why apprenticeship persisted’. 
8 Kaplan, ‘Reconsidering’, p. 212. 
9 Griffiths, Youth, pp. 330-5; Ben-Amos, ‘Failure’; Steidl, ‘Silk Weaver’, pp. 145-150; 
Rappaport, Worlds, pp. 232-34 
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Our data allow us to reconsider many standard assumptions about 
how apprenticeships started, how many apprentices stayed with their 
master, what proportion went to serve other masters, and which 
apprentices became freemen. As we show, rule and reality diverged in 
such a way as to indicate frequent and consistent evasion of the formal 
institutions of apprenticeship, despite their enactment in statute law and 
the supervision of guild and civic officials. We also find that apprentices’ 
decisions about whether or not to complete their terms were broadly 
consistent with their access to resources and opportunities. Hidden within 
the superficially rigid rules of apprenticeship was a plural and flexible 
training institution, supplying skills according to demand and adapting the 
terms of service to the needs of individuals. The formal rules and the 
rents they implied for masters still mattered. But they shaped only one of 
several possible outcomes of apprenticeship. 
Apprenticeship varied in its details from city to city across Europe. 
In England a distinctive national character had been given to 
apprenticeship through the Statute of Artificers in 1563.10 This applied 
London’s existing customs throughout the country as part of an attempt to 
regulate urban and rural labour. The institution of apprenticeship defined 
by the Statute included a longer period of service – a minimum of seven 
years – than in many other countries.11 The practice of the trades and 
crafts it covered was limited to those who had served an apprenticeship, 
but notionally the qualification was portable and service did not limit a 
master to working in a specific place, although some corporate towns, 
including London and Bristol, did seek to exclude those apprenticed 
elsewhere, and one of the key benefits of a completed apprenticeship 
was settlement and the entitlement to poor relief it brought. There were 
 
10 Ben-Amos, Adolescence; Snell, ‘Apprenticeship system’; Brooks, ‘Apprenticeship’; 
Lane, Apprenticeship; Dunlop and Denman, English Apprenticeship. 
11 On terms: Reith, ‘Apprentices’, pp. 182-3. 
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also some restrictions on access to apprenticeship, intended to exclude 
the poor and rural labourers from entering service; these were seemingly 
rarely applied. Some details of service – particularly the distribution of the 
costs of board and clothing, fees to be paid to the master, living 
conditions, and the exact term – were negotiated between the master and 
the apprentice and his friends or family, but the lineaments of service 
were well defined.12 The formal completion of an apprenticeship in 
England was therefore notionally more valuable than in most of Europe – 
as it permitted an individual to practice a trade throughout the nation – 
and also more onerous, in taking so long to achieve. By contrast, 
elsewhere in Europe, the specific terms of service appear to have 
generally varied more between individuals, trades and cities.13 That said, 
it is important to emphasise that apprenticeship in England shared many 
of the standard features found across Europe: the apprentice was 
subjected to the quasi-paternal authority of his master; his work was 
supplied in exchange for training; he usually lived in his master’s 
household; his manners, entertainment and freedom to marry were 
limited; and he normally received no wage.14  
 
 
I 
Our data consist of samples of apprentices and masters in the 
cities of London and Bristol in the late seventeenth-century. These cities 
offer useful starting points for an examination of apprenticeship. 
Apprentices in England were highly mobile, travelling long distances to 
enter into service with masters with whom they had no kin or 
 
12 On negotiation: Stabel, ‘Social mobility’, pp. 160-1; Kaplan, ‘L’Apprentissage’. 
13 Reith, ‘Apprentices’, pp. 182-4; De Munck, Technologies, pp. 59-68. 
14 For Europe, see: Kaplan, ‘L’Apprentissage’; Nicholas, ‘Child’; Epstein, ‘Craft Guilds’; 
Farr, Artisans; De Munck & Soly, Learning. On wages for apprentices: Reith, 
‘Apprentices’. As most English apprentices in this period were male, the generic 
apprentice is taken to be male here. 
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geographical connection, and training in occupations very different to that 
practiced by their father.15 Both were large cities that served as focal 
points for migratory systems in which apprentices played a major part. 
London was by far England’s largest city, with a population of around half 
a million in 1700. As Wrigley observed, the level of migration needed to 
sustain the capital’s growth in this period meant that one in six of 
England’s population would have lived in the city at some time.16 
Apprentices were one of the major categories of migrants, and in the later 
seventeenth century records survive of around 2,700 youths – or 6.5% of 
English teenage males - from across the country entering an indenture in 
the city each year.17 Bristol’s field of recruitment was smaller, befitting the 
third largest English city with a population of around 20,000 in 1700.18 
Annually, around 250 youths became apprentices in Bristol between 1686 
and 1696, largely from the city and its neighbouring counties. While 
distinctive in some ways, particularly in its orientation to the Atlantic trade, 
Bristol is reasonably representative of a second-tier English city in this 
period.  
For London, the main part of the data that we use in this project is a 
sample of apprentices and their masters in the 1680s and 1690s. The 
sample was constructed by integrating four sources. First, a set of 
London Livery Company Apprenticeship lists that contains 17,868 
apprentices indentured to masters in 48 City Companies in the period 
1685-1695. These records include the names of masters and 
apprentices, and information about the geographical and social origin of 
 
15 Leunig, Minns, & Wallis, ‘How fluid were labour markets’. 
16 Wrigley, ‘Simple Model’. 
17 The average number of recorded apprentices per year in London, 1676-1700, was 
2,740 (Beier and Finlay suggest a total of c.4,000 apprentices per year: ‘Introduction’, 
p. 15). Wrigley et al’s population and age distributions give an estimate of 41,925 male 
17 year olds in 1686: Wrigley, Population History, pp. 614-15. In the second and third 
quarter of the seventeenth century, the equivalent percentages are 3.3% and 3.8%.  
18 Sacks, Widening Gate, p. 353; Corfield, Impact of English Towns, p.15; Yarborough, 
‘Geographical’, pp. 113-30. 
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apprentices.19 Second, the London Poll Tax Database for 1692 which 
includes the names of around 13,000 heads of households in London, the 
parish where they lived, and often their occupation or company.20 Third, 
the Index to the Duty on Births, Marriages and Death Assessments (a tax 
on vital events in families and a poll tax on bachelors and childless 
widowers), which identifies those named in detailed manuscript listings of 
the inhabitants of London. The listings are organised by household, 
including servants and lodgers, and survive for around 110,000 
individuals from 93 London parishes in 1695.21 Fourth, the Association 
Oath Rolls (1696), which lists signatories to an Oath of Loyalty to William 
III circulated in 1696 in response to suspected Jacobite plots. Most males 
over the age of twenty appear to have subscribed, and in London the 
signatories are organised by Livery Company, giving a sample of 21,970 
active Company members in 1696.22
We linked the sources as follows. First, householders with 
occupations named in the Poll Tax listings were linked by name and 
parish to householders listed in the indexes to the Duty on Burials, 
Marriages and Death Assessments from 1695. This produced a sample of 
household heads with parish and occupational information. To reduce 
weak links, we used the Association Oath Rolls to exclude householders 
who shared their name with another member of the same company. 
Using name and occupation or company, we then linked our sample of 
householders with the masters of our sample of apprentices. Finally, we 
used the manuscript listings for the Marriage Duty Assessments to see 
which apprentices were still living with their masters in 1695.23 Each stage 
 
19 Webb, London Livery. 
20 Alexander, ‘Poll Tax database’, Centre for Metropolitan History, University of London. 
See: Arkell, ‘Poll taxes’; Alexander, ‘Economic’.  
21 6 & 7 Wm. & M., c. 6. Glass, London inhabitants; London Metropolitan Archive 
(hereafter LMA), COL/CHD/LA/04/02/003-004. 
22 Webb, Association Oath.  
23 LMA, COL/CHD/LA/04/01/1-110.  
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in the linkage was made using at least two distinct characteristics.24 We 
were unable to link merchants in London in the same way, as they were 
categorised differently in the 1692 Poll Tax. We have, however, included 
a sample drawn from the merchants identified by Perry Gauci.25
Our analysis for Bristol was based on similar materials and 
methods, but was made much simpler by the existence of a complete 
published Marriage Duty Assessment listing for the city in 1696.26 We 
linked this to the population of apprentices indentured in the city during 
the ten years prior to 1696.27 Matching was simpler and stronger because 
of the presence of masters’ wives’ names in the apprenticeship register. 
The matching exercise identified 1,091 apprentice and master pairs in 
London and 2,230 in Bristol, where linkage was much less complex and 
therefore more productive. Roughly 60 percent of the London sample 
were resident within the city walls, broadly in proportion to the distribution 
of the metropolitan population at this time. 
The linked database we have created includes a range of 
apprentice and master characteristics for both cities. Several 
characteristics are common to both samples: apprentices’ county of 
origin, the distance they had to travel to be apprenticed,28 and the 
occupation of their fathers.29 We also have information about masters in 
both cities – the size of their household, whether another apprentice was 
present on the tax date, and a crude indication of their wealth from an 
internal tax threshold (having £600 in personal estate or an income of £50 
p.a.). There are also some important differences in the characteristics 
 
24 To overcome the problem of variant spellings we employed the Double Metaphone 
algorithm developed by Gill Newton to code names, and then manually sifted for good 
matches. 
25 Gauci, Politics of Trade, pp. 19-24. 
26 Ralph and Williams, Inhabitants of Bristol. 
27 Bristol Record Office (hereafter BRO), 04353/2. 
28 Estimated from the distance between the county town and London or Bristol. 
29 We used E.A. Wrigley’s P.S.T occupational coding scheme when grouping fathers’ 
occupations. 
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recorded in the data on the two cities. For London, we know whether the 
apprentice’s father was deceased, whether he was a citizen of the City of 
London, and we have constructed an indicator whether he belonged to 
the same company as his son’s master. On the master’s side, the London 
data also reveal whether the master lived within the City walls, or in a 
suburban parish, where the city’s companies (guilds) tended to be 
weaker.30 We also have different information about the master’s trade for 
Bristol and London. For London, we know the parent’s occupation, but 
only the master’s company. Although technically centred on particular 
crafts, London’s companies included freemen practising a range of 
occupations. Smaller and newer companies, for example spectacle-
makers, tended to be more homogenous, while the larger, older and more 
powerful companies, such as those in the ‘Great Twelve’, had more 
varied memberships. For Bristol, both the parent and the master’s 
occupation is recorded. This is much more specific than in London, and 
also allows us to say whether the master and father had the same 
occupation. The Bristol data also identifies 60 pauper apprentices, 
although only 20 can be linked to an identified master. 
One limitation of our analysis is that the linking process used 
means that our samples are not wholly representative of the full variety of 
apprenticeship situations. In London, only living masters who had been 
independent householders for at least three years are captured, biasing 
our sample towards the more successful and prosperous. Quakers are 
also excluded, as they generally refused to take the Association Oath. For 
Bristol, our sample is more comprehensive, but it is still likely to miss 
cases where masters had died between the date the indenture was made 
and 1696.  
In addition, it is important to draw attention to a key assumption in 
what follows: that apprentices lived with their masters while they were in 
 
30 Berlin, ‘Broken’; Ward, Metropolitan communities. 
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service. Clearly a few apprentices may have been lodging elsewhere. But 
in this period apprentices still usually lived in their masters’ households.31 
In Bristol in this period, three indentures were recorded with a note stating 
that the apprentice or their mother was to find them lodging, suggesting 
this was still a sufficiently unusual practice to need formalising. Moreover, 
there is no reason to suspect lodging habits varied over apprentices’ 
terms in a way that might explain the pattern of presence and absence we 
found. Further evidence of the significance of residence is given in the 
discussion of freedoms below. 
A further consideration is that our data is drawn primarily from the 
1690s. Our sample of apprentices crosses 1688, the year of the Glorious 
Revolution. Most were indentured in the subsequent period of political 
tension that affected the city and country deeply.32 This was also a period 
of economic difficulties. The Nine Years War (1688-97) depressed trade 
and shipping. By 1695, Bristol alone had lost 202 ships to the French. 
English exports to Spain and the Mediterranean were a quarter of their 
level in the mid-1680s.33 The taxation needed to fight William II’s 
continental campaigns put ever greater pressures on manufacturing and 
trade, with a series of new poll taxes and excise duties to fuel the 
ballooning national debt.34 The deterioration of the coinage caused by 
clipping would lead to a re-coinage in 1696 and economic crisis through 
shortage of coin, but had created uncertainty around the specie before 
then.35 Together war, re-coinage and bad harvests conspired to produce 
high food prices, peaking in 1698, and lower real wages.36 It is plausible 
that the conditions in this decade had a role in shaping selection into 
 
31 Wallis, ‘Apprenticeship’, p. 842; De Munck and Soly, ‘Learning’, p. 21; Steidl, ‘Silk 
weaver’, p. 147. 
32 De Krey, Fractured society; Hoppit, Land of Liberty? 
 33Jones, War and Economy, pp. 130-1, 159; Rose, England, pp. 126-8 
34 Brewer, Sinews, pp. 89, 95-100, 114 
35 Rose, England, pp. 137-40; Horsefield, British Monetary Experiments, pp. 14-17; 
Jones, War and the Economy, pp. 20-21 
36 Clark, ‘Price History’, pp.  41-124; Clay, Economic Expansion, I, 52. 
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apprenticeship. It is less clear, however, that social and economic 
changes will have a large effect on the decision to remain in 
apprenticeship among youths and families who had already begun 
invested considerable time and resources in obtaining training. It also 
seems that the institutional system of corporate apprenticeship continued 
to function much as it had over the previous century.37
 
 
II 
Legally and ritually, an apprentice’s service began when they 
signed or marked their indenture, which was then inspected and recorded 
by civic or guild officials in corporate towns like London and Bristol, and 
they took their oath to serve their master.38 Once indentured, apprentices 
were legally tied into a seven or eight year term of service. If they made it 
to the end, they would on average have spent more than a quarter of their 
life as apprentices. But what happened in between, and how many 
apprentices did complete their terms? There has long been uncertainty 
around these questions. Across Europe, a relatively small proportion of 
apprentices became citizens or freemen, but this is a poor indicator for 
completion as the benefits of the freedom were most valuable to those 
with the assets and ability to establish an independent business. Ben-
Amos, Steidl, Wallis and others have drawn attention to other evidence 
that many apprentices did not complete their terms. 39 Even so, the most 
 
37 Walker, ‘Guild control’; Schwarz, London, pp. 210-11; Berlin, ‘Guilds in decline?’. 
38 Hanawalt, Growing Up, pp. 139-40. In London company registration usually occurred 
on the same day as binding. The indentures for 72 London apprentices in our sample 
survive; 67 bear the same date as the entry in the company records: 3 differed by one 
day, one by four days, and one by three months: LMA, CLRO COL/CHD/FR/02. In 
Bristol, indentures were sealed at the city’s Tolzey Court, held in the guildhall. 
39 See: Wallis, ‘Apprenticeship’, pp. 838-9. 
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recent survey of European apprenticeship suggests that ‘the 
overwhelming majority of the apprentices did serve out their contract’.40  
The reality of apprenticeship in England appears to have been 
much less settled. Figures 1 and 2 give rolling 10-month averages for the 
proportion of apprentices present in their masters’ households in London 
and Bristol over their terms of service. These are indenture cohorts in 
which each observation month represents the behaviour of a different 
group of apprentices. For example, the proportion present in the first 
month of year 5 in London is calculated from the cohort of apprentices 
bound between January 1690 and November 1690 who were still present 
in May 1695. These are snapshots of the stock of apprentices, and do not 
say anything about changes in the composition of the stock over time. In 
addition, it is important to note that there are three types of apprentice 
absence that contribute to our calculated rate of presence. Some 
apprentices were present at some point in their indenture, but were 
absent temporarily when the household was surveyed. Others who had 
been present at some point had since left the master’s household on a 
permanent basis. While some apprentices may never have actually been 
resident with their master, despite agreeing terms. The rolling averages 
will be lower than the actual proportion of apprentices who were present 
at some stage in their term of service, as we are unable to formally 
distinguish among the three reasons for absence in the single cross-
section.  
In both London and Bristol we find a clear picture of staged decline 
over apprentices’ terms. In both cities, large numbers of apprentices left 
their original master’s household before their contract was completed and 
most departures occurred in the first half of the term. In London, the 
proportion of apprentices resident with their masters peaked at around 
70% between the sixth and twenty-fourth month of service, it then 
 
40 De Munck and Soly, ‘Learning’, p. 10. Authors’ italics. 
13 
 
                                                           
declined sharply, to a trough of below 40% in year four. There are small 
upturns in years five and six, which we will explore in more detail later, 
before a final decline at the end of the sixth year of service. The two steep 
falls at the end of year seven and eight reflect the mix of seven and eight 
year terms in our sample. In Bristol, we find broadly similar patterns. The 
main difference is that Bristol apprenticeships appear to have been 
slightly more compressed than in London, starting later and tailing off 
slightly earlier.41
While the dominant impression of Figures 1 and 2 is the decline in 
presence over time, it is also clear that the start of apprenticeship was 
less clear-cut than might be expected. For some apprentices, their 
service was preceded by a trial period, a customary practice to ensure 
that they and their master were well-suited.42 As can be seen in Table 1, 
trials were common in London, where 42% of apprentices were present in 
the six months before they were bound, and somewhat less so in Bristol, 
where only 16% of apprentices were present before being indentured. 
The smaller size of the city and its local recruitment market may help 
explain this: residence was less necessary for a trial period. These trials 
were not overly long though, and none exceeded six months.  
More striking is the slow arrival of many apprentices. Although for 
all official purposes the date at which service began was the date of the 
indenture, in practice the start of apprenticeship as a period of resident 
work and training appears to have frequently occurred much later. In 
London, only around two-thirds of apprentices were actually present in 
the household in the first year after the date of their indentures. When we 
look more closely at this period in Table 1 we find that the proportion of 
apprentices present is actually rising over the year, from 58% present in 
 
41 Bristol apprenticeships were for seven years, with only three exceptions bound for 
eight years in this period. 
42 Dunlop and Denman, Apprenticeship, p. 162. 
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the first six months to 68% present in the second half of the first year. In 
Bristol the lag between indenture and arrival is even more stark. Few 
apprentices were with their master in the months immediately after the 
formal date of their binding, and the proportion present only rises above 
50% a year after their terms of service had technically begun. This does 
not appear to have been the result of young apprentices continuing to live 
with their parents while they began work.43 In a few cases, they may have 
been at school.44 But for most, it seems likely that that the legal and 
effective dates of contracts were different: apprentices had to be present 
in person to enter indentures, but most took their oaths and then went 
away again, only joining their masters’ household months or even years 
later. Further evidence for this is in a few cases where apprentices 
appear to be indentured twice, suggesting that their initial indenture was 
never implemented. As a result, even when they completed, most 
apprentices’ actual term of service was substantially lower than the 
statutory minimum.  
Behind the aggregate patterns in Figures 1 and 2 lies considerable 
variety in how apprenticeship functioned within different groups and 
trades, variety of a kind not captured in the formal rules or the standard 
accounts of service. One aspect of this is the presence of subtle 
differences between local and migrant apprentices in the two cities. In 
London, migrants’ earlier arrival appears to have translated into slightly 
longer effective terms, as they left around the same time as London-born 
apprentices (Figure 3). Overall levels of presence are similar, and the 
main difference between them though comes after the term is completed, 
and is discussed below. Bristol (Figure 4) seems, if anything, to show the 
 
43 If this was the case, we would expect to find more migrants with their master in the 
first year. This was not the case. 
44 Ben-Amos, Adolescence, pp. 112, 173; Guildhall Library (hereafter GL), MS 5257/5, 
f. 131. 
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opposite: locals’ effective terms are longer than migrants, who are absent 
particularly toward the end of the term.  
However, it is when we look at apprentices’ presence by occupation 
that we find the most striking differences between modes of 
apprenticeship. We can do this most accurately for Bristol, where we 
know the occupation rather than the guild of the master. Figures 5 shows 
the proportions of apprentices present for several distinct groups of 
trades. The most dramatic divergence from the city average presented in 
Figure 2 is among merchant and sea-faring apprentices (Figure 5a) 
Apprentices in these trades were expected to travel on behalf of their 
master. Merchants’ apprentices in particular jealously guarded their right 
to act as a factor overseas as this was often the main foundation of their 
later independent trading. This characteristic of apprenticeship was on 
occasion determined formally. For example, the timing of absence was 
set out in the contract for seafarer apprentice Thomas Garrard, whose 
master agreed that ‘at the end of three first years [he was] to go to sea’.45 
The extent to which these apprentices were absent from the household is 
nevertheless unexpected: absence appears to have consumed much of 
their period of service, with relatively low peaks of presence in the first 
and last years of the term giving the figure a bimodal distribution.  
While service in other trades bore closer resemblance to the 
collective norm, the occupational breakdown reveals two characteristics 
of apprenticeship that are largely obscured in the overall average. First, 
the rise in presence in year six in Figures 3 and 4 appears to be the 
product of a much more distinctive pattern of decline in the second half of 
the term followed by a marked resurgence in the year or so before 
completion.46 This pattern is visible among the cluster of general 
 
45 BRO, 04353/2, f. 243. Grassby, Business community, pp. 195-6; Gauci, Politics, pp. 
71-3 
46 The resurgence does not appear to be a cohort effect, due to demographic or 
economic factors. First, the timing of the bump is similar in London and Bristol despite 
16 
 
                                                                                                                                                                             
manufacturing trades, the building and the food trades (Figures 5b, 5c, 
5d). Among coopers and soap-makers (Figure 5e), two trades that were 
relatively closely linked to the city’s port and industrial focus, nearly all 
apprentices remained with their masters in the first half of their term. Yet 
even among this group there was a marked dip in years four and five, 
before many – particularly among locals – seem to have reappeared. 
Second, the differences between local and migrant apprentices varied 
between trades. As the numbers are small, figure 5 does not show this 
divide, and for some, such as building apprentices,47 the pattern looks 
random and there is little reason to think that the two groups behaved 
differently. But in several others it seems that migrants were less likely to 
remain, especially in the final years of service. This pattern is clearest in 
the general manufacturing trades.48 These are all crafts practised widely 
in the region as well as the city, and here we see a clear divergence 
between the two groups of apprentices in the last years of the terms of 
service. Local-born apprentices were likely to return and complete, with 
63 percent being present in years 6 and 7, versus 50 percent in years 4 
and 5. Among migrants, presence actually declined in the last two years 
of expected service, with only 54 percent in years 6 and 7, and 77 percent 
present in years 4 and 5. Similarly, among coopers and soap-makers, the 
increase in presence in year 6 and 7 was 30% lower for migrants.  
For London, we can only subdivide apprentices by company. Even 
this, though, reveals striking differences that echo the findings from 
Bristol. As figures 6a and 6b show, the proportion of apprentices present 
with masters in the larger, less cohesive, and more mercantile companies 
 
the observation point being different by a year. Second, the difference between local 
and migrant resurgence suggests that endogenous rather than exogenous factors are 
driving the pattern. 
47 This group includes apprentices in the following trades: house-carpenter, tiler and 
plasterer, tiler, plumber. 
48 This group consists of apprentices in the following trades: cordwainer, weaver, 
blacksmith, pewterer, currier, serge-weaver, clothworker, pinmaker, silkweaver, brazier, 
serge-maker, carpenter, glover, turner, smith, culter, dyer, basketmaker. 
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of the Great 12 falls away much more dramatically than in the smaller 
more homogenous companies outside that group. The late rise in 
presence at the end of the term is also much more marked outside the 
Great 12. Institutional capacity may also matter here, as larger 
companies’ size limited their ability to control apprenticeship and 
employment. In the two London companies for which we have the most 
apprentices, the vintners (6c) and the apothecaries (6d) , there were quite 
different patterns.  We find high rates of return at the end of their terms 
among the relatively well regulated apothecaries, compared to little if any 
divergence from the strong downward trend in proportion present among 
vintners’ apprentices, whose masters tended to recruit large numbers of 
apprentices, presumably in anticipation of this high rate of departure.49  
One point in service where the rules of apprenticeship did work 
roughly as intended was at the end. For those who made it to the close of 
their contracted term of service, the end of apprenticeship remained a 
firm break in both Bristol and London. Even if we consider just those 
apprentices who persisted into the later years of their term, only around 
one in five remained with their masters after the seven years was past. 
Some of the other apprentices may have moved out, perhaps to marry, 
but continued to work for the same master. Nonetheless, it seems that for 
most apprentices employment ended with the end of the contract.50 It is 
unlikely that the proportion of apprentices who continued in employment 
with the same master was high enough to provide masters with the 
reasons (information about employees’ skills) for taking on apprentices 
that are sometimes suggested for modern firms, or apprentices with a 
reason (such as higher earnings after completion at their training firm) to 
 
49 Wallis, ‘Medicines’, p. 146. Between 1600 and 1750, London vintners who took any 
apprentices trained an average of 4.7 over their career.  
50 Cf. Levene, ‘Honesty’, p. 192. 
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keep them in service up to that point.51 Apprenticeship in these cities did 
not normally form a stage in an ongoing direct employment relationship. 
The one partial exception to this is migrant apprentices in London, 
a quarter of whom were still with their master in the ninth year. The 
proportion present in the tenth year declines again, suggesting that 
departure was only deferred temporarily. This may indicate a greater 
reliance among migrants on masters’ for an initial position as a 
journeyman, as their own networks were weaker than local apprentices. It 
could also be that migrant apprentices were more likely to have to make 
up time lost through absences at the end of their contract: travel time 
would have multiplied the impact of temporary departures for sickness, 
family or holiday. This is observed occasionally in agreements by masters 
to resume training apprentices who have absented themselves.  
If anything, apprentices were more likely to trim months off their 
contracts than extend them beyond their term. Their slow arrival at the 
beginning of their service was repeated in reverse at the end. The 
proportion of apprentices present begins to fall away at the beginning of 
their seventh year, or even earlier, in both cities. It is not uncommon to 
find agreements for early completion, sometimes in exchange for a gift or 
fee, set out in guild records, and this features in a number of petitions for 
the freedom in London.52 However, our data suggest that masters were 
allowing a far larger proportion of apprentices to be absent during their 
final months of contracted service than official records would indicate.  
Apprenticeship in England was in practice often quite different to 
the settled relationship between master and apprentice envisaged in law 
and much of the literature. One implication of our findings are that, as well 
as many who left service, a far larger proportion of apprentices spent a 
period outside their master’s household than has normally been 
 
51 Acemoglu and Pischke, `Beyond Becker’; Smits and Stromback, Economics. 
52 LMA, COL/CA/05/02, s.v. Baron, 1690; Batty, n.d.; Chase, c. 1688; Corbett, c. 1670;  
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assumed, even in settled services and manufacturing occupations where 
this lacked the obvious justification possessed by seafarers and 
merchants. This suggests that apprentices were involved in a diverse and 
mobile market for training and labour, which we discuss further below. 
Another implication is that effective terms were shorter than the law 
prescribed, revealing the importance of informal norms that circumvented 
the terms of the official regulations. Finally, it would seem that 
apprenticeship contracts were ended early as often as they were 
completed: this was simply not a rigidly enforced contract.  
 
 
III 
The most telling characteristic of apprenticeship revealed by figures 
3 to 6 is the very large numbers of apprentices who were not living with 
their masters at various points during their contracted period of service. 
On average, one in two apprentices that we would expect to find were 
missing. There are several alternative explanations for apprentices’ 
absences. Perhaps ten percent of apprentices died during their term: 
migration from the relatively healthy countryside into large towns in 
particular carried a high risk to health.53 Some apprentices decided to 
leave their trade, or were ejected from service for disorder or crime.54 
While runaways inevitably tend to dominate in most sources, which are 
largely derived from legal disputes, where apprentices lacked the 
necessary aptitude, inclination and good relationship with their master, 
departures might well be beneficial for both apprentices and masters. If 
mutually agreed, they needed no external authorization to end the 
contract and this could occur without any external record being made. 
The remainder continued to train or work in the same trade. Among these 
 
53 Schwarz, ‘London Apprentices’, pp. 18-22. 
54 Griffiths, Youth, pp. 299-313, 324-341; Ben-Amos, Adolescence, pp. 103-8. 
20 
 
                                                           
apprentices were some who had permanently left their master, either 
legally or illicitly, while others were working on his account outside his 
household, and sometimes outside the city.  
Although almost invisible in the rules and prescriptive literature, 
absences and early departures were a major feature of the practice of 
pre-modern apprenticeship. They appear occasionally in court records 
and apprentice autobiographies. As an apprentice shipwright, Phineas 
Pett spent time away from his master assisting two other master 
shipwrights.55 On arriving in London, the shoemaker’s apprentice 
Benjamin Bangs moved around, searching out ‘good workmen’ and later 
the ‘best Workmen’ to work for in order ‘to become a Master’ of his 
business.56 Both Roger Lowe and William Stout finished their training as 
grocers running separate shops on behalf of their master.57 We also find 
masters hiring out their apprentices for wages.58 Apprentices also left 
their masters in search of new skills. The apprentice surgeon George 
Benson, for example, was permitted by his master to ‘travell for his better 
experience in his profession’ in exchange for a fee.59  
Alongside these legitimate movements were apprentices bound by 
masters and then passed on surreptitiously to others whether within or 
outside their company – a regular subject of complaint at company and 
city levels as it challenged their control of the trade, limits on numbers of 
apprentices within workshops, and bars on apprentices receiving 
wages.60 Such ‘colourable’ service was of constant concern to the urban 
 
55 Ben-Amos, Adolescence, pp. XXX. 
56 Hobson, Memoirs, pp. 12-13. 
57 Winstansley, Diary of Roger Lowe, p. 41; Marshall, Autobiography of William Stout, 
p. 25  
58 Ben-Amos, Adolescence, pp. 127-8. BRO, MS 08018, Ordinances for City 
companies, f. 56; Bird, Laws respecting masters, pp. 35-36; GL, MS 5257/5, f. 170; 
Gregg and Boswell, Stationers' Company, pp. 61-2. 
59 GL, MS 5257/3, f. 45. See also, GL, MS 5257/4, f. 41. 
60 GL, MS 5257/3, f. 39; 5257/5, f. 239; LMA, Repertories of the Court of Aldermen, 
61/258b, 63/171; 63/373, 64/73, 66/209, 66/291; BRO, J/Tol/2/1, pp. 506, 504, 497-6, 
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authorities. When Thomas Blee’s former master petitioned against him 
being granted the freedom of London it was this he targeted, accusing 
Blee of leaving him and being ‘turned over to.. a Carrman under colour of 
Service but never actually served him as an apprentices but hath ever 
since acted as a Porter’.61 While in Bristol in 1672 the Mayor and 
Aldermen ordered that the Master of the Shoemaker and Curriers’ 
Company report on every apprentice before they were freed because of 
early marriages and ‘secret practices and combinacons betwixt them & 
their said Masters [who] have taken severall somes of money of them & 
given leave to such servants to depart their service & to worke where they 
like & yet by such private agreements at their seven yeares end engage 
to make such servants free of the Citty’.62 Other apprentices breached 
their indentures by marriage, or taking up some other occupation, even 
running away to sea, for a time.63  
Of course, absences were not all one-sided: masters might 
abandon their apprentices. Some, such as Henry Fowler, purportedly 
attempted to drive them off with hard treatment in order to profit further 
from the premium they had received.64 Others became bankrupt or fled 
both their debts and apprentices, leaving them ‘without any manner of 
sustenance’.65 The least fortunate, such as the Bristol goldsmith Elisha 
Kelson, ended in gaol, unable to employ or train their apprentice.66
In this section we examine three aspects of absences that shed 
some light on some of what implications apprentices’ departures had for 
 
470, 439. Apprentices were barred from receiving wages in London, see: LMA, 
Repertories, 65/39b; LMA COL/CA/05/02, s.v Brunsdon (c.1762). 
61 LMA, COL/CA/05/02, A-C, 22 Jan 1711. See also: ibid, s.v. Clarke, n.d. 
62 BRO, MS 08018, p. 27. Examples include: McGrath, Records, pp. 38, 40, 49; Pelling, 
Common Lot, pp. 212-213. 
63 LMA, Repertories, v. 63, f. 91, v. 88, f. 1b, v. 91, f. 65; v. 94, f.45. see also: Ben-
Amos, Adolescence, pp. 213-5; Griffiths, Youth, pp. 330-5. 
64 BRO, JTOL, J/2/1, p. 513. See also, ibid, pp. 543, 546-5, 516.  
65 Evans, Eccho, pp. 4-5; BRO, JTOL, J/2/1, p. 533. See also; ibid, p. 531. 
66 BRO, JTOL, J/2/1, p. 514. 
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the institution. Firstly, we look at the capacity of the formal institution to 
manage the movement of apprentices and the evidence of movement of 
apprentices between masters in the same city and company. Secondly, 
we look at the relationship between the contractual absences we observe 
and entry to the freedom – the next major institutional stage in the civic 
hierarchy. Thirdly, we look more closely at the relationship between some 
aspects of apprentices’ and masters’ characteristics and the likelihood 
that apprentices would stay with their master.  
The formal institution of apprenticeship did include one permissible 
way for apprentices to leave their original masters while continuing to be 
trained. This was for the apprentice to be ‘turned over’ to another master 
in the same craft. These transfers could be relatively common. Among 
London apothecaries in the seventeenth century, for example, Wallis 
found that 17% of apprentices were turned over to another master.67 
Turning over was often a response to events undermining the original 
relationship, including the death, sickness, bankruptcy or retirement of a 
master. It was occasionally, and inconsistently, recorded in company or 
civic records. However, many, probably most, turnovers were not 
recorded in official sources, although company approval was technically 
expected in London and the company or Tolzey Court’s approval in 
Bristol. Apprentices might engage with both formal and informal turning 
over, complicating the picture. Thomas Gibbs, a London bakers’ 
apprentice served a different master for the first six years of his term ‘but 
was not turn’d over to him according to ye Custome’. However, he was 
then ‘turn’d over before ye Chamberlain to Joseph Golding of ye same 
Company & Trade with whom he completed the terme’.68 Among our 
London apprentice sample, 27 (2.5%) were officially turned over; in Bristol 
 
67 Wallis, ‘Medicines’, p. 146. On illicit inter-company transfers: Schwarz, London, 
p.218. 
68 LMA, COL/CA/05/02, D-K, s.v. Gibbs, c. 1718. 
23 
 
                                                           
the total was 54 (2.5%). These are implausibly low rates and may be in 
part due to the limitations of the administrative records available, although 
we do, of course, miss most moves forced by death or disruption of 
business. 69  
For apprentices, turning over was only one form by which they 
moved between masters. It shaded into working under license from their 
master, envisaged particularly in ordinances for the building trade, and 
into various underhand arrangements to circumvent company rules on the 
numbers of apprentices that masters were permitted to indenture. 
Fortunately, we can obtain some estimate of the scale of mobility 
between households in the same company using our sample. To estimate 
this we identified which individuals living as servants or lodgers in the 
households of the masters in our sample had been indentured to other 
masters in the same craft. In London, we found that 65 servants and 
others shared a name with an apprentice indentured in their head of 
household's company in the previous seven years.70 Our sample group of 
masters had taken 916 apprentices in the seven years before (of whom 
455 were present in June 1695). This suggests - as a very crude estimate 
of the minimum rate of mobility between masters’ households- that 
around 7% of apprentices were passed to other masters, whether turned 
over or working under some other arrangement. In Bristol, where we have 
the entire population of apprentices, we searched for the 619 apprentices 
indentured in the city in the seven years to 1696 whom we had not found 
with their original master. We identified 28 of these apprentices among 
the servants and others living in the households of those masters in our 
 
69 In Bristol 53 apprentices (22 of whom were present) were bound to masters who died 
before 1696 and whose widows maintained their household. 
70 The linkage was restricted to apprentices bound in the master’s company from 1688 
to 1695, who were not found with their own master, and who did not possess a very 
common name (eg: John Wells; Thomas Powell). The 65 servants and others matched 
to apprentices were found with 46 different new masters. Four were part of our original 
master-apprentice sample. 
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sample who practised the same trade as their original master. This gives 
a very small proportion of mobile apprentices compared to London (2%), 
but given the tight constraints on linkage in Bristol, this is likely to be an 
underestimate.71 For Bristol, where the Marriage Duty Tax is most 
complete and the population small enough to render nominal linkage 
feasible, we can also look for absent apprentices in other households in 
the city.72 We searched for two groups: coopers and soap-makers, given 
their high likelihood of returning to their master, and a general group of 
unusually named apprentices, to reduce the chance of bad matches.73 Of 
33 absent coopers and soap-makers’ apprentices, two were with their 
parents and nine may have been servants in other households, although 
several of these were individuals with very common names.74 Of the 24 
apprentices with unusual names who were not with their master, two were 
‘servants’ in other households, two were with their parents, and one had 
married and established an independent household. It is unclear how well 
any of these estimates can be generalised, as these masters were, of 
course, themselves recruiters of new apprentices, and their practices 
were not necessarily representative of other masters. Nonetheless, these 
rough figures seem to suggest that while movement to another master in 
the same trade and city might account for up to 10 percent of the 
apprentices who were absent in 1695, it is unlikely to explain the majority 
of absences. 
 
71 Occupational information in Bristol is relatively precise compared to the company-
level information for London, but this leads to the exclusion of links where apprentices 
were working in cognate trades (eg: blockmaker and shipwright) or masters pursued 
multiple occupations. 
72 It is worth noting that this is also a further argument against lodging out being an 
explanation for the persistence rates we find. 
73 Unusual names were defined as those that occur fewer than six times among the 
356,000 people named in marriage licenses issued by the Vicar-General of the 
Archbishopric of Canterbury for the period 1694-1800: Society of Genealogists, Vicar 
Generals’ Marriage Licence Index. 
74 For three apprentices, there was more than one possible nominal linkage.  
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Turning over and local movements were one way for the institution 
of apprenticeship to manage mobility. But to understand the implications 
of the absences we found earlier, we need to see how they influenced the 
next steps that apprentices took. In this, apprenticeships’ institutional 
integration into the wider framework of corporate life offers us one way 
forward. Apprenticeship was the major method through which young men 
became freemen and burgesses, as citizens were termed in London and 
Bristol respectively, and the privileges of the citizen – particularly the 
economic right to trade independently and the political rights to vote – 
were one of the key benefits of completion. Becoming a citizen therefore 
offers a crude proxy for one kind of successful transition out of 
apprenticeship. Unfortunately, data on freedoms is scarcer and more 
fragmentary than on indentures. For London our data is limited to certain 
companies with the best records of freedoms.75 We have better evidence 
for Bristol, from the published lists of Bristol Burgesses, and can establish 
with some measure of confidence which apprentices became citizens.76 
Historians have long been aware that many apprentices did not become 
freemen. However, they have not been able to identify whether this was 
because of they had not completed their apprenticeship, or because of 
what happened to them afterwards. The freedom data also allows us to 
address another related issue. Because it represented a continuation of a 
youth’s corporate career, entry to the freedom allows us to consider the 
extent to which absence indicated a breakdown of service and training. 
We now turn to these questions. 
Overall, only a minority of apprentices became freemen or 
burgesses, as we would expect from the literature. In London, a third 
 
75 We examined the freedom records of 19 companies, in which 593 apprentices were 
bound in the seven years to may 1695. Freedom registers were searched for the 
Apothecaries, Curriers, Cutlers, Distillers, Farriers, Feltmakers, Fishmongers, 
Founders, Grocers, Innholders, Ironmongers, Masons, Needlemakers, Painters, 
Pinmakers, Stationers, Turners, Tylers, and Vintners. 
76 Bristol & Avon Family History Society, Bristol Burgess Books. 
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(35%) became freemen, while in Bristol the proportion was slightly higher 
at 43%, as can be seen in Tables 2 and 3.77 In both cities, local 
apprentices were more likely to become freemen than migrants (46% to 
30% in London and 47% to 39% in Bristol), likely reflecting the role of the 
cities in providing training to the country as a whole and the advantages 
of local resources in establishing an independent business.  
When we look at the relationship between apprentices’ presence in 
their masters’ households and the freedom, we find a less direct 
relationship than one might expect from the centrality of completion to 
approval as a citizen. In both cities, masters had to attest under oath to 
their apprentice having served his full indenture ‘after the manner of an 
Apprentice’ before they could be freed; the penalty for dishonesty was 
disenfranchisement for both.78 Yet as Tables 2 and 3 show, a substantial 
minority of apprentices became freemen despite being apart from their 
original master. It is true that apprentices who became freemen were 
more likely to be found with their masters – on average 69% were present 
compared to 51% overall in London and 73% compared to 56% in Bristol. 
But it was not the case that future freemen always stuck with their master. 
The proportion of future freemen found with their master actually declined 
over their term of service in London (Table 2, column 7), although this is 
less apparent in Bristol. After peaking at four-fifths in the third year, in the 
second half of their term only around two-thirds of future freemen were 
still living with their original masters, and this plunged to 54% in year 
 
77 In the text we refer to the summary row covering the proportion of apprentices 
present from 6 months to seven years to reduce the impact of late arrivals on the 
figures. 
78 For the certification, see: LMA, COL/CHD/FR/12/048, s.v. Cheale 1766. 
Disenfranchisement was not frequent, but cases were regularly presented in the 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. See, for example, LMA, Repertories, v. 70, f. 
19b; v. 87, ff. 199b, 206b, 210; v. 91 f. 98; v. 92, ff. 103, 215; LMA, COL 
CHD/FR/12/048, s.v. Ansley (1720). An index to disenfranchisement cases, including 
‘Masters disenfranchised for making their apps free upon untrue declarations.’ is at 
LMA, COL/CHD/FR/12/005. 
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seven. If we look at the likelihood of becoming a freeman from the 
perspective of absent apprentices we find little difference between the 
cities. In London, 23 percent of those apprentices who were not living with 
their masters in 1695 were later freed. For Bristol, the figure is 26 percent. 
Those apprentices who were absent but later freed were clearly still 
actively and successfully engaged in the craft, despite being away from 
their master for some time during their term of service. For both cities, the 
rates of absence among apprentices who later became freemen seem 
substantially to exceed our admittedly rough estimates for turning over 
and movement within the city. Evidence that some absent apprentices 
returned to their masters at the close of their term further suggests that 
absence captures more than turning over. This was visible in the figures 
discussed earlier, and can be seen here in the late surge in the proportion 
of apprentices present who were later freed (column 8). This is clearest in 
London, where from the proportion present rises from 44% in year six to 
68% in year seven, but also seems visible in Bristol where the proportion 
rises to 65% in year seven. We can only speculate here, but it seems 
likely that these late returns were intended to regularize their service and 
allow their master to present them to company and city officials as having 
completed their term. Together with the evidence of relatively low rates of 
intra-city and company movement, this also seems to suggest that a 
substantial share of absent apprentices were working on a temporary 
basis outside the city, whether for their master or themselves. Inevitably 
our evidence is tentative on this, but the proportion of absent apprentices 
entering the freedom was little different when the usual suspects among 
merchant and seafaring apprentices are excluded, suggesting that 
mobility extended across a wide range of occupations.  
As apprentices’ low overall levels of entry into the freedom 
emphasise, service was not a direct route into the citizenry, particularly in 
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London.79 As a rough estimate, perhaps half of those apprentices who 
completed their contracts with their original master did not become 
freemen in London. Whether they then remained in the city or not is 
unfortunately impossible to say. The relationship between remaining with 
one’s master and entering the freedom was stronger in Bristol. By the 
final years of an apprenticeship, almost two-thirds of Bristol apprentices 
who remained with their master would later become burgesses. Although 
the exigencies of life could surely intervene in the plans of the most 
ambitious apprentice, it is hard to know if the remainder who completed 
but never became freemen should be seen as failures, given that 
migration remained an option and journeymen prospered in some trades. 
Either way, that around a third to one half of apprentices who completed 
their term did not become freemen underlines how outcomes varied even 
when an apprenticeship contract was completed.  
As we have seen, the practice of apprenticeship varied between 
cities, between trades and between locals and migrants. But apprentices 
and masters varied in other ways that may have affected training 
practices: variations in their wealth, personal connections, and household 
characteristics may have shaped the likelihood that apprentices remained 
with their master over the duration of their indenture. Our data sources 
include information on several characteristics related to both masters and 
apprentices, which we have used to estimate regression models of 
apprentice persistence. Tables 4 and 5 present the results of this 
analysis.  
As we discussed earlier, the tax records indicate whether 
apprentices were resident in their master’s house on one particular day. 
We have estimated probit regression models where the dependant 
variable indicates whether or not the apprentice was present. The 
regression is estimated for apprentice observations where we have 
 
79 Cf. Farr, Artisans. 
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complete information about for the full range of apprentice and master 
characteristics. This leaves us with almost 700 observations for London, 
and over 1300 for Bristol. Summary statistics for the characteristics 
underlying the regression analysis are provided in appendix Tables A1 
and A2. Absence may indicate either permanent or temporary departure 
from the master’s household. We cannot distinguish between the two in 
the source we use. We can partially address this shortcoming by 
including year dummies to control for changes in presence rates over the 
length of the contract due to unmeasured factors causing temporary 
absence from the household. Tables 4 and 5 cut the samples across four 
dimensions: all apprentices (column 1), recent apprentices (2), and local 
(3) and migrants (4) respectively. The coefficients reported have been 
transformed into marginal effects. It should also be noted that caution 
must be exercised when comparing estimates in the two tables. In 
particular, the Bristol sample contains greater occupational detail than the 
data for London, and for this reason, we have not created a pooled 
sample.  
Most of the results confirm our earlier observations about 
occupational variation and the differences between local and migrant 
apprentices. The divergence in apprenticeship between occupations is 
most clear in the case of Bristol where the evidence is better. There, 
apprentices in manufacturing occupations, particularly coopering and 
carpentry, had a relatively high propensity to be present. For London, our 
data on this is weaker, but we find a general difference between 
apprentices in London’s Great Twelve companies and the rest. 
Apprenticeship also clearly varied in duration for locals and migrants. The 
effect of distance is concentrated early on in apprenticeship (Table 4, 
column 2): among new migrant apprentices in London, those from 100 
miles away were 10% more likely to be present. In Bristol, by contrast, the 
pattern is the reverse of that in London: migrants from further away were 
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much less likely to be present, although the effect was not significant over 
the shorter time frame. In additional regressions (not included here) we 
found that the effect of distance on persistence declined with duration in 
both cities. For example, after three years in London, apprentices from 
Yorkshire were no more likely to be found in their master’s household 
than Londoners. This suggests that the effect of distance is reflecting 
differences in when migrant and local apprentices began their service.  
The real value of the regressions is in revealing reasons for 
absence among apprentices. While the evidence for intra-city movement 
and absent apprentices entering the freedom have demonstrated the 
importance of temporary absence as part of a mobile training and work 
regime, the results of the regression suggest that many of those 
apprentices who were absent had left because their prospects were 
better elsewhere, while those who remained were often endowed with 
resources that tied them to their city of apprenticeship. While the 
impossibility of distinguishing between the different kinds of apprentice 
absence renders any discussion tentative, the results suggest that some 
portion of absences were the result of apprentices responding to their 
future prospects and leaving opportunistically, and probably permanently.  
The most compelling indication of this comes from Bristol (Table 5), 
where we have data on whether masters and parents shared an 
occupation. The coefficient on this variable is positive in the full sample 
and among local apprentices (columns 1 and 2), but is negative among 
migrants (column 3). Bristol-born apprentices whose father practised the 
occupation in which they trained were much more likely to be with their 
master. Migrant apprentices from a family engaged in the same 
occupation as their master were more likely to leave. It would seem 
plausible that the value of a completed term was greater for those with 
local commercial connections, while migrants were more likely to leave to 
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exploit existing familial networks, to which they added the benefit of 
Bristol training and connections.  
In London, the size, quality and location of apprentices’ networks 
and family resources also affected whether they stayed with their master. 
Local apprentices from prosperous origins (gentlemen, distribution and 
sales) and, especially, the sons of London citizens were significantly more 
likely to be present, with the opposite was true for migrant apprentices. 80 
It seems that exploiting localised familial wealth and commercial 
connections attracted apprentices to their origins, whether distant or 
nearby. When their ties were in the City itself this meant completing their 
indentures: the effect of being a citizen’s son is not significant among 
recent apprentices. The results are not as clear cut in Bristol, for which 
few of the parental background variables are important.  
The results also throw some light on the relationship between the 
masters’ household size and prosperity and the likelihood of apprentices 
being present. In London, both local and migrant apprentices training with 
masters with large households (seven people or more) were more likely 
to be found with their master; this mattered particularly later in their term 
(cf. Table 4, column 2). Again, this suggests that masters’ volume of 
work, indicated by their total household size, and their levels of success 
also shaped apprentice outcomes. Interestingly, masters’ wealth and 
location within the City walls only mattered for migrants (column 4). The 
difference may suggest that the quality of connections and opportunities 
that a master could provide was more important for migrants, whereas 
London-born apprentices were less reliant on their masters for networks. 
The results for Bristol on these characteristics are less clear. Household 
size has the same sign, but is only significant for migrant apprentices. 
The wealth of masters is reversed, however: and poorer masters were 
more likely to have their apprentices present, particularly if Bristol-born. 
 
80 This parental connection is only relevant for London-origin apprentices. 
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This may indicate different patterns of employment in training, but could 
also be an effect of the importance of travel to the business of successful 
masters in a dedicated port city.  
Finally, there are two other results that should be mentioned briefly. 
First, the presence of another London apprentice in the tax roll was 
negatively correlated to apprentice persistence. As the coefficient is 
smaller in the early years it seems plausible that this indicates 
replacement. In contrast, the presence of another apprentice is strongly 
significant for Bristol born apprentices, possibly indicating the greater 
importance of workshop clusters there. Second, apprentices whose father 
had died were no more or less likely to stay in training. A wealth shock 
associated with death of a parent may have had an impact on the ability 
to access training in London, but once in the city it does not appear to 
have affected the operation of apprenticeship.  
Where does this leave our explanation of absences? Clearly, an 
apprentice could be absent for several quite different reasons. 
Apprenticeships surely did not only end because of sickness, abuse or 
exploitation, as has sometimes been suggested.81 Some apprentices 
were away temporarily, either on their own account or their masters’ 
behalf, and many of them seem likely to have been outside the city; 
some, although perhaps only a tenth, left to work for other masters; while 
others had seemingly quit entirely, preferring to use the skills they had 
acquired elsewhere. The experiences of apprenticeship also varied 
substantially between locals and migrants, rich and poor, in a way that 
suggests that apprentices’ decisions were shaped by their alternative 
options, personal connections and access to capital.82 In deciding 
whether to complete their indentures, at least some apprentices seem to 
 
81 De Munck and Soly, ‘Learning’, p. 10. 
82 See also: Stabel, ‘Social mobility’, p. 175. 
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have been responding rationally to the combination of resources and 
opportunities that they faced.  
We can only speculate about the balance between permanent and 
temporary departures. A rough estimate based on entry to the freedom 
would suggest that at the close of their term around 10 percent of all 
apprentices in London were absent but continuing in service in some 
form, whether under the same master or another.83 The rate would be 
higher in some occupations, such as merchants. This would also suggest 
that roughly 54 percent of London apprentices completed their term in 
some form. For Bristol, the equivalent calculation gives a slightly higher 
rate of 57%.84 These levels of mobility among English apprentices 
undoubtedly reflect the unusual length of the national minimum contract 
of seven years. Indeed, for many English youths, apprenticeship would 
have combined experiences that elsewhere in Europe would be 
differentiated into the separate stages of apprenticeship and 
journeywork.85
 
 
IV 
Our findings suggest that the institution of apprenticeship was much 
more fluid than is traditionally understood. Four conclusions can be 
 
83 In London, 44 percent of apprentices were present with their original master in year 6 
of their term. Around two-thirds (65%) of these apprentices became freemen, indicating 
that (44% x 0.65) = 28.6% of apprentices at this stage were both present and would 
become freemen. Because 35 percent of all apprentices became freemen, this implies 
that (35%- 28.6% = ) 6.4 percent of future freemen were absent temporarily or had 
been turned over. If we assume that the proportion of two-thirds of completing 
apprentices becoming freemen applies to absent apprentices, we get an estimate that 
(6.4 x 1/0.65 =) 9.8 % of all apprentices were temporarily absent or turned over but still 
in the trade. 
84 For Bristol, the figures are 53% present in year 6, of whom 76% become burgesses, 
while 43% of all apprentices became burgesses. So, (43- (53 x 0.76)) 2.78% of future 
freemen were absent and (2.78 x 1/0.76) 3.7% of absent apprentices were away 
temporarily or turned over. 
85 Epstein, ‘Labour Mobility’; Reith, ‘Circulation’. 
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highlighted. First, English apprenticeship was not ‘inflexible’.86 As we 
have seen, pre-modern apprenticeship in London and Bristol was often 
shorter than the term set in indentures, with months or years trimmed at 
the beginning or end. Youths entered apprenticeships in large numbers, 
but only around half completed their term with their original masters. 
Mobility was commonplace. The diverse practices apparent in London 
and Bristol resemble the negotiated variations in service apparent 
elsewhere in Europe much more than the rules would suggest. Second, 
the formal rigidity of the Statute of Artificers and guild and civic rules hid a 
wide variety of practices that differed across cities, trades and individuals. 
These patterns are largely invisible in the official records that are the main 
source on apprenticeship and offer a further caution, if one were needed, 
to attempts to extrapolate practices from rules. 87 Third, apprentices may 
have been in the social and legal position of children in their masters’ 
households, but they were not behaving as children in their choices. 
Whether a common apprentice culture bridged such different experiences 
remains an open question, but the variety of forms of service we find 
seems likely to support Griffiths’ account of a ‘multitude of particular 
worlds’ among apprentices.88 Fourth, the differences between local and 
migrant apprentices, in particular, underline the importance of urban 
service as part of wider system of mobility and training. Apprenticeship 
encompassed flows through cities and their institutions in order to obtain 
the skills and connections that were concentrated there, as well as 
permanent in-migrations. Apprenticeship was not just one level of the 
urban labour market. It was an integral part of a wider, national training 
market.  
 
86 Lane, Apprenticeship, p. 2. 
87 Ogilvie, ‘Guilds’, pp. 292-4; Ben-Amos, ‘Failure’; Steidl, ‘Silk Weaver’, p. 151. 
88 Griffiths, Youth and Authority, p. 165. Cf. Smith, ‘London apprentices’; Yarborough, 
‘Apprentices as adolescents’. 
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What does this suggest about the role of the formal institutions of 
apprenticeship? Clearly, in these cities at least, apprenticeship indentures 
were not firmly secured by self-enforcing contracts, as has recently been 
suggested.89 Apprentices departed in large numbers despite the 
consequences of non-completion and even among those who completed, 
the extent of their service was often shorter than that set out by law. As 
Wallis recently suggested, masters were unable to assume they could 
recover any initial training costs in the latter part of the contract, as 
anticipated in some interpretations of the economics of apprenticeship. 
Compensation for these masters’ investment in training must therefore be 
managed through an alternative mechanism.90 But while the rules of 
apprenticeship were not observed exactly, they did still matter. The formal 
completion of indentures remained a concern for a substantial proportion 
of apprentices, including a number who would not become freemen or 
burgesses. Among those who reached the end of their term with their 
original masters, apprenticeships did tend to end when they were meant 
to. And apprenticeship’s entrenchment within the wider corporate system 
of early modern England led at least some apprentices to tailor their 
movements around the rules, ensuring that they returned to their official 
master in good time before their term finished. 
It is for those apprentices who did make it to the end of their 
contracts that the institutions of pre-modern English apprenticeship 
appears most like the rent-seeking distributional coalitions that Sheilagh 
Ogilvie has discussed.91 This group of advanced apprentices were 
relatively highly skilled and so had the largest incentive to defect to 
another employer or set up independently. Yet instead they generally 
stayed and served, or at the least returned for the final year or so. Some 
 
89 Epstein, ‘Craft Guilds, Apprenticeship’; De Munck and Soly, ‘Learning’, p. 10. 
90 Wallis, ‘Apprenticeship’, pp. 845-91. 
91 Ogilvie, ‘Whatever is, is right’. 
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received compensation from their masters that may have appeased them 
to some extent, but the persistence of apprentices in the latter period of 
their terms of service suggests that completion and the reputational and 
legal benefits it brought did still matter. While apprenticeship was more 
fluid than is usually thought, England’s urban economy continued to be 
shaped by the corporate structures of guilds and the requirements of the 
Statute of Artificers. 
Once we abandon the assumption that apprenticeship needed high 
rates of completion to function, it becomes much less surprising that the 
practice of apprenticeship should take the form outlined here. Training 
would surely vary between occupations. Institutions in cities as different 
as London, with its half million inhabitants and Bristol, with fewer than a 
twentieth of its population, should be expected to differ. And the 
expectations of locals and migrants, rich and poor, the well-connected 
and the outsider must diverge, and their responses to their circumstances 
would diverge with them. Apprentices were starting later, finishing earlier 
and shifting master and household in ways that suggest that the 
institution of apprenticeship was widely adapted according to the 
individual and their circumstances and resources with at least some 
degree of agreement from both apprentices and masters. This was 
certainly not costless, but the costs of strictly enforced contracts that 
cannot be adapted to circumstances may also be high for the agents 
involved. A uniform training schedule imposed by law across all crafts and 
individuals could be burdensome for individuals and the economy as a 
whole. Evaluating the wider benefits and costs of the institution is beyond 
the reach of this paper, however.  
Apprenticeship was, in short, not the uniform and rigid institution 
vigorously policed by society and guilds that is sometimes imagined. 
Rather it was an amalgam of informal norms developed around inflexible 
formal benchmarks. At times, this was presumably positive, allowing bad 
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decisions to be fixed, changing situations to be responded to, and 
differing needs – whether for labour, training, or capital - to be met. At 
times such flexibility might be abused, as any deviation from the official 
formula for service supplied material that could be deployed in legal 
disputes if the agreement broke down, informal agreements could not be 
monitored and regulated by company or city, and both parties faced 
serious risks from asymmetric information and opportunistic behaviour in 
such circumstances. Certainly, apprenticeship should not be idealised: 
some apprentices were undoubtedly abused and exploited, while some 
masters suffered at the hands of wasteful or opportunistic apprentices.92 
Nonetheless, the evidence of internal and external mobility within 
apprenticeship suggests the existence of a market for training in which 
apprentices and masters engaged in numerous different ways. As our 
understanding of the pre-modern economy has slowly adjusted to 
recognise greater variation in productivity, output and rates of innovation, 
so it needs to encompass a more diverse understanding of relationships 
between actors within the labour market. 
 
92 Rushton, ‘Matter in variance’, pp. 94-98; Griffiths, Youth, pp. 313-24; Pelling, 
‘Apprenticeship’, pp. 41-51; Levene, ‘Honesty’, pp. 193-199. 
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Table 1: Apprenticeship before and immediately after indenturing, London 
and Bristol 
 
  Number of apprentices Percentage of apprentices present 
Period of 
service 
London Bristol London Bristol 
-1—0.5 38 0 0% 0%
-0.5-0 33 47 42% 6%
0-0.5 31 70 61% 24%
0.5-1 46 91 70% 41%
1 to 6 yrs 453 885 50% 58%
 
Notes: Children of masters excluded. 
 
Table 2: London apprentices and the freedom
year of service 
Apprentices 
indentured 
(N) 
Apprentices 
present in 
1695 (N) 
Apprentices 
later freed 
(N) 
Apprentices 
freed 
present in 
1695 (N) 
% 
Apprentices 
present in 
1695 
% 
Apprentices 
freed 
% 
Apprentices 
freed 
present in 
1695 
% 
Apprentices 
present in 
1695 and 
later freed 
  I II III IV II/I III/I IV/III IV/II 
1         65 42 18 11 65% 28% 61% 26%
(6m-1)         40 29 11 9 73% 28% 82% 31%
2         63 39 30 23 62% 48% 77% 59%
3         98 55 38 28 56% 39% 74% 51%
4         75 39 26 17 52% 35% 65% 44%
5         53 22 19 13 42% 36% 68% 59%
6         57 25 17 11 44% 30% 65% 44%
7         62 19 24 13 31% 39% 54% 68%
8         80 19 22 10 24% 28% 45% 53%
9         56 6 4 2 11% 7% 50% 33%
Totals (yr 0-7) 593 289 205      135 49% 35% 66% 47%
Totals (yr 0.5-7) 448 228 165      114 51% 37% 69% 50%
 
Notes: see text for source details. 
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Table 3: Bristol apprentices and burgesses
year of 
service 
Apprentices 
indentured 
(N) 
Apprentices 
present in 
1696 (N) 
Apprentices 
later freed 
(N) 
Apprentices 
freed 
present in 
1696 (N) 
% 
Apprentices 
present in 
1696 
% 
Apprentices 
freed 
% 
Apprentices 
freed 
present in 
1696 
% 
Apprentices 
present in 
1696 and 
later freed 
      I II III IV II/I III/I IV/III IV/II
-1         50 6 27 3 12% 54% 11% 50%
1 102 47 36 20 46% 35% 56% 43% 
(6 m – 1yr) 182 72 75 35 40% 41% 47% 49% 
2 200 133 74 58 67% 37% 78% 44% 
3 194 132 92 79 68% 47% 86% 60% 
4 179 103 73 57 58% 41% 78% 55% 
5 212 115 92 68 54% 43% 74% 59% 
6 189 100 82 62 53% 43% 76% 62% 
7 148 79 67 51 53% 45% 76% 65% 
8         131 42 63 25 32% 48% 40% 60%
9         91 10 34 9 11% 37% 26% 90%
total (all)         1576 792 679 447 50% 43% 66% 56%
total (yr 0.5-7) 1406 781 591 430 56% 42% 73% 55% 
 
Notes: see text for source details. 
49 
 
Table 4: Explaining apprentice retention, London sample
 Probit – marginal effects 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 bound may 
1687-april 
1695 
Bound may 
1693-april 
1695 
London or 
Middlesex 
origin, bound 
may 1687-
april 1695 
Migrant 
origin, 
bound may 
1687-april 
1695 
Distance to London 
(miles) x 100 
.06 (2.5)*** .10 (2.3)*** --- .05 (1.8)** 
Parent deceased .03 (0.6) .06 (0.5) -.02 (-0.2) .08 (1.3) 
Parent citizen of 
London 
.14 (2.2)*** .09 (0.8) .19 (2.4)*** --- 
Parent gentleman -.05 (-0.7) -.03 (-0.3) .25 (1.5)* -.13 (-1.5)* 
Parent yeoman -.02 (-0.3) -.05 (-0.4) .20 (1.1) -.07 (-1.0) 
Parent other 
agriculture 
-.09 (-0.8) -.20 (-1.2) --- -0.7 (-0.7) 
Parent distribution & 
sales 
.03 (0.4) -.12 (-1.0) .18 (2.0)*** -.22 (-1.9)** 
Parent service -.13 (-1.6)* -.24 (-1.4) -.26 (-2.0)** .01 (0.1) 
Parent other 
professional 
-.05 (-0.6) -.37 (-2.2)*** -.16 (-0.8) -.08 (-0.8) 
Parent labourer .02 (0.1) .15 (0.7) -.35 (-1.5)* .32 (1.4) 
Master household of 
seven or more 
.15 (3.3)*** .14 (1.7)* .19 (2.6)*** .11 (1.7)** 
Other apprentice 
present, May 1695 
-.18 (-3.9)*** -.05 (-0.6) -.24 (-3.2)*** -.18 (-2.9)***
Master within city 
walls 
.08 (1.9)** .06 (0.8) .02 (0.3) .13 (2.3)*** 
Master below 
income/wealth 
threshold 
-.07 (-1.4) -.04 (-0.5) .08 (1.0) -.17 (-2.7)***
Parent in master 
company 
-.07 (-0.9) .09 (0.6) -.12 (-1.1) -.01 (-0.1) 
“Great 12” company -.17 (-3.2)*** -.08 (-0.8) -.13 (-1.6)* -.19 (-2.8) 
Year dummies Y Y Y Y 
Pseudo R-square .13 .09 .22 .13 
N 685 178 269 412 
 
Notes: Coefficients are marginal effects, and z-scores are in parentheses. Craft worker is 
the excluded parent occupation group. Coefficients marked *, **, and *** are significant at 
the 15, 10, and 5 percent level. 
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Table 5: explaining apprentice retention, Bristol sample
 Probit – marginal effects 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Bound may 
1688-may 
1696 
Bound may 
1694- may 
1696 
Bristol origin, 
bound sept 
1688-aug 
1696 
Migrant 
origin, bound 
may 1688-
aug 1696 
Distance to Bristol (miles) 
x 100 
-.11 (-1.8)** -.12 (-1.3) --- .09 (0.8) 
Parent gentleman -.02 (-0.3) .06 (0.4) .27 (0.9) -.04 (-0.5) 
Parent yeoman .02 (0.4) -.11 (-0.9) .14 (0.7) .01 (0.2) 
Parent other agriculture -.0004 (-0.01) -.03 (-0.4) .10 (0.5) -.02 (-0.3) 
Parent distribution & sales .11 (2.3)*** .16 (1.8)** .14 (2.3)*** -.04 (-0.4) 
Parent service -.04 (-0.7) -.13 (-1.4) -.07 (-1.1) .002 (0.02) 
Parent other professional .06 (0.9) .05 (0.5) .05 (0.4) .05 (0.6) 
Parent labourer .12 (1.2) 1.1 (0.5) .20 (1.8)** -.16 (-0.8) 
Master barber .17 (2.0)*** .26 (1.5)* .11 (1.0) .25 (1.8)** 
Master joiner .01 (0.1) -.06 (-0.3) .16 (1.0) -.10 (-0.9) 
Master carpenter .17 (1.8)** .09 (0.3) .17 (1.5)* .14 (0.8) 
Master tailor .002 (0.02) .0002 (0.00) .07 (0.4) -.01 (-0.04) 
Master baker -.001 (-0.02) .07 (0.4) .16 (1.1) -.10 (-0.8) 
Master cooper .12 (2.1)*** .04 (0.4) .17 (2.1)*** .08 (1.1) 
Master grocer .14 (1.6)* .09 (0.5) .27 (1.7)** .11 (0.9) 
Master merchant -.31 (-4.7)*** -.28 (-2.4)*** -.15 (-1.6)* -.45 (-5.2)*** 
Master soapmaker .13 (1.8)** .03 (0.2) .17 (1.5)* .11 (1.1) 
Master weaver .10 (1.1) -.002 (-0.02) .09 (0.9) .07 (0.4) 
Master seafaring trade -.31 (-7.5)*** -.31 (-4.1)*** -.27 (-4.5)*** -.35 (-6.1)*** 
Master household of 
seven or more 
.08 (2.4) .13 (2.0)*** .05 (1.0) .11 (2.4)*** 
Other apprentice present, 
May 1696 
.044 (1.4) .01 (0.1) .14 (3.0)*** -.03 (-0.6) 
Master below 
income/wealth threshold 
.05 (1.3) .07 (0.4) .13 (2.1)*** .002 (0.05) 
Master same occupation 
as parent 
.12 (2.8)*** .18 (2.3)*** .13 (2.8)*** -.25 (-1.8)** 
Pauper apprentice -.04 (-0.2) --- -.07 (-0.3) .04 (0.1) 
Year dummies Y Y Y Y 
Psuedo R-square .13 .14 .13 .18 
N 1348 377 652 696 
 
Notes: Coefficients are marginal effects, and z-scores in parentheses. Craft worker is the 
excluded parent occupation group. All other master occupations are the excluded group for 
master categories. Coefficients marked *, **, and *** are significant at the 15, 10, and 5 
percent level. 
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Table A1: Summary statistics for London sample of apprentices 
 bound may 1687-may 1695 
 All London Migrants 
Present in May 1695 (%) 49 47 50 
Distance to London (miles) 81 
(100) 
--- 
--- 
134 
(97) 
Parent gentleman (%) 12 5 
 
17 
 
Parent yeoman (%) 18 4 
 
26 
Parent other agriculture (%) 5 1 
 
7 
Parent craft (%) 36 52 
 
26 
Parent distribution & sales (%) 13 24 
 
7 
Parent service (%) 7 9 5 
Parent other professional (%) 7 4 10 
Parent labourer (%) 2 1 2 
Master apothecary (%) 12 12 12 
Master butcher (%) 8 7 8 
Master stationer (%) 8 9 8 
Master vintner (%) 21 21 20 
Master great 12 company (%) 30 31 30 
Father deceased (%) 23 23 23 
Master household of seven or more (%) 47 51 39 
Other apprentice present, May 1695 (%) 56 58 34 
Master below income/wealth threshold (%) 60 60 75 
Father in company of master (%) 7 12 4 
Father citizen of London (%) 20 49 0.2 
Master inside city walls (%) 52 50 54 
N 685 272 413 
 
Notes: see text for details of sample construction. 
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Table A2: Summary statistics for Bristol regression sample 
 bound may 1688-may 1696 
 All Bristol Migrants 
Present in May 1696 54 59 50 
Distance to Bristol (miles)  23 
(27) 
--- 
--- 
44 
(21) 
Parent gentleman (%) 4 0.3 
 
7 
 
Parent yeoman (%) 8 1 
 
14 
Parent other agriculture (%) 13 1 
 
25 
Parent craft (%) 46 60 
 
33 
Parent distribution & sales (%) 11 17 
 
6 
Parent service (%) 9 15 5 
Parent other professional (%) 7 3 10 
Parent labourer (%) 2 3 1 
Master joiner (%) 2 3 3 
Master house carpenter (%) 2 3 2 
Master merchant tailor (%) 2 2 2 
Master baker (%) 3 2 3 
Master cooper (%) 8 7 9 
Master grocer (%) 3 2 4 
Master merchant (%) 7 7 6 
Master soapmaker (%) 5 4 5 
Master weaver (%) 3 5 1 
Master seafaring trade (%) 15 17 14 
Master household of seven or more 
(%) 
37 36 
 
39 
Other apprentice present, May 1696 
(%) 
32 29 34 
Master below income/wealth 
threshold (%) 
77 79 
 
75 
Master same occupation as parent 
(%) 
19 37 2 
Pauper apprentice (%) 1 1 0.4 
N 1348 652 696 
 
Notes: see text for details of sample construction. 
Figure 1: Proportion of London apprentices resident with their master 
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Figure 2: Proportion of Bristol apprentices resident with their master 
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Figure 3: London apprentice persistence, migrants and locals 
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Figure 4: Bristol apprentice persistence, migrants and locals 
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Figure 5: Bristol apprenticeship persistence, selected trades 
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a) Merchant and seafaring apprentices   b) Baker and butcher apprentices 
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c) Building craft apprentices  d) Other craft apprentices (not port-
specific) 
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e) Cooper and soapmaker apprentices 
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Figure 6: London apprenticeship persistence, inside and outside the Great 12 
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a) Great 12 apprentices    b) Apprentices outside Great 12 
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c) Vintner apprentices    d) Apothecaries apprentices 
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